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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I.

FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In Wing v. Anderson' the Tenth Circuit applied the criteria
for standing to contest a search and seizure which the Supreme
Court had announced in Brown v. United States.2 Wing, convicted of armed robbery, challenged the search of a vehicle belonging to a friend. The search was conducted while he was hiding
in some weeds several blocks away. The court pointed out that
Wing was not present at the search, that he had no possessory
interest in the vehicle, and that he was not charged with an
offense which included, as an essential element, possession of the
items seized (a traffic ticket issued to him, sunglasses with his
fingerprints on them, and fingerprints lifted from the vehicle's
interior).
It is undisputed that probable cause must exist prior to a
search or seizure of an automobile. Less clear is the question on
what basis a vehicle may be stopped and its driver questioned,
however briefly. The Tenth Circuit grappled with this question
in two cases, muddling the issue in the first but clarifying it in
the second. The two cases are United States v. McDevitt3 and

United States v. Jenkins.4
McDevitt was stopped by a New Mexico policeman who
wanted to see if the U-Haul truck McDevitt was driving carried
goods for hire. McDevitt's papers were in order, but the policeman requested McDevitt to come to the police car. The policeman radioed headquarters and, upon learning that McDevitt was
a Navy deserter, arrested him. Some time later the truck was
towed to headquarters and 800-900 pounds of marijuana was
found in it.'
No. 74-1056 (10th Cir., July 28, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
411 U.S. 223 (1973). There is no standing where the defendants: (1) Were not on
the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) alleged no proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises; and (3) were not charged with an offense that includes,
as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure. Id. at 229.
508 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974).
No. 74-1567 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1975).
The record before the court was not clear about all the circumstances occurring
between the arrival of the truck at headquarters and the discovery of the marijuana. There
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The court first reiterated the requirements necessary to justify the stop of an automobile:
In order for an officer to stop and search a vehicle there must
exist some basis for suspicion, at least, that the driver has violated
the law ....

Similarly, an automobile may be stopped for inspection without
probable cause, but the act of stopping may not be arbitrary. Thus,
our court has said that "even an investigatory detention must be
based on reasonable ground, if not probable cause." '

A few paragraphs later the court cited several of its earlier cases, 7
including United States v. Lepinski,8 which held that a routine
stop to check driver's license and registration was reasonable and
proper. 9 Then instead of focusing upon the lack of probable
cause I0 to detain McDevitt after his papers were found to be in
was no warrant for the search, but there might have been a voluntary admission by
McDevitt or a valid inventory search. The cause was remanded for further proceedings or
a new trial. 508 F.2d at 12-13.
1 508 F.2d at 10-11 (emphasis added). One of the several cases cited for the statement
on stop and search was Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For the latter proposition
regarding stopping for inspection, the court cited United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 18
(10th Cir. 1972). Fallon involved a stop for a vehicle registration and driver's license check.
New Mexico law requires all operators of motor vehicles to show registration and license
upon demand of an officer. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-3-11, 64-13-49 (1953). The Falloncourt
did, it is true, express some doubt about the statutes. The sentence quoted from Fallon
in McDevitt reads in full:
The fact that the occupants appeared to have been "hippies" in and of itself
did not justify even a preliminary investigation, and it is doubtful whether
the statute contemplates purely arbitrary stops, for even an investigatory
detention must be based on reasonable ground, if not probable cause.
457 F.2d at 18 (emphasis added). But in the preceding paragraph, the court made it clear
that the validity of the statutes was not in question: "We need not determine whether an
arbitrary arrest pursuant to this statute would be justified..."since there were articulable facts making the stop and limited questioning reasonable. Id. (emphasis added).
' United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1972); United States v. Fallon,
457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sheppard, 455 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Granado, 453 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Suldana, 453
F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sanchez, 450 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Self, 410 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1969).
s 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972).
The same New Mexico statutes as in Fallonwere involved. See note 6 supra.
10If there was no probable cause to detain McDevitt after his papers were found to
be in order, then the subsequent arrest for desertion and any inventory search of the
vehicle would be fatally tainted by the illegality of that detention. On the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This analysis would have obviated the need to discuss the validity of the original stop and would
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order, the court discussed the validity of the original stop itself
and in the process strained to distinguish Lepinski:
In Lepinski and the other cited cases the original stopping of the
vehicle and the temporary detention were not invalid. The present
case, however, stretches the Terry doctrine to the breaking point.
The Terry concept cannot apply to an arbitrary stopping of a vehicle
for the purpose of possible discovery of a law violation."

Yet, why is a "routine" stop for a check of license and registration
made, except for a possible discovery of a violation, viz., driving
without proper license or registration? 2 Perhaps the invalidity of
the stop in McDevitt is due to the lack of express delegation of
power to New Mexico policemen to stop and inspect vehicles
which are capable of carrying goods for hire; the power of officers
to stop vehicles for the purpose of license and registration checks
is clear. But if this is the real difference, the court should have
said so.
The defendant in United States v. Jenkins" sought a reversal
of his conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle,
asking the court to apply McDevitt to his case. Jenkins was
stopped by a New Mexico patrolman for a "routine registration
check." When he produced an expired driver's license and no
registration for his vehicle, the policeman asked Jenkins to follow
him to the station. On the way the officer learned from headquarters that Jenkins' vehicle had been stolen in California. At the
station Jenkins was placed under arrest.
The sole issue in Jenkins was the validity of the original stop.
restrict the further proceedings upon remand to the question of a spontaneous and voluntary admission by McDevitt of marijuana possession.
A somewhat similar case last year involved a valid stop for routine, restricted purposes. United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in Tenth Circuit
Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 185 (1975). When a search following the stop was conducted
without probable cause, the Tenth Circuit held the search was illegal and reversed the
conviction.
508 F.2d at 12.
0 To hold that license and registration checks must be based at least on reasonable

suspicion would take the teeth out of the laws: "A contrary holding would render unenforceable the [California] statute requiring that automobile drivers be licensed." Lipton
v. United States, 348 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Turner, 442
F.2d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1971); Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967): "[Tlhe stopping for road checks is reasonable and

therefore acceptable" if not a "ruse."
'3

No. 74-1567 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1975).
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Jenkins' counsel relied heavily on United States v. Fallon4 and
McDevitt and asked that Lepinski be reexamined. Instead, the
court reaffirmed Lepinski and, while not overruling McDevitt,
read the language of McDevitt "in context" and found it inapposite to Jenkins.5
The court also pointed approvingly to a footnote in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,5 a Supreme Court case decided be457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 6 supra.
No. 74-1567 at 5-6. The court distinguished McDevitt from Lepinski and Jenkins
partly on what the routine check disclosed. In McDevitt the papers were found to be in
order, but in Lepinski and Jenkins the checks revealed immediately that the papers were
not in order. While this is a factual distinction, it is also an impermissible legal distinction. The result of an action does not determine whether the action was legal at its
inception. The Tenth Circuit itself made that point in relation to searches in Harris v.
United States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The reasoning in
Harris is valid as well here: "[A] search in violation of the constitution is not made lawful
by what it brings to light .
Id. at 841, citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
29 (1927).
Is 422 U.S. 873 (1975). It was decided on the same day as the other "border patrol"
cases, Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), and United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975). These three cases and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), dealt with
issues left unresolved by the landmark border search case, Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Both Peltier and Bowen held that Almeida-Sanchez was not
retroactive. Brignoni-Ponce held that officers on roving patrols near the border, but not
at the border or its "functional equivalent," must base a stop of a vehicle on "articulable
facts" and then must restrict their questions to citizenship and immigration status and
suspicious circumstances. Anything more requires consent or probable cause. Ortiz dealt
with searches at fixed traffic checkpoints and held that, consistent with Brignoni-Ponce,
searches not at the border must be based on consent or probable cause. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in Ortiz, said on the matter of stops:
[T]he Court's opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to
fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such
stops involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or
significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively
serve the important national interest in controlling illegal entry. I do not
regard such stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether
or not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion" that a particular vehicle is
involved in immigration violations . ...
422 U.S. at 898-99. On the other hand, Justice White, in an opinion in which Justice
Blackmun also concurred, expressed doubt about Justice Rehnquist's views:
The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my
Brother REHNQUIST notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions
checkpoint investigative stops, without search, will be difficult to justify
under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 914-15.
"
"
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tween McDevitt and Jenkins. On state and local police powers,
the Court said in Brignoni-Ponce:
Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of
the Border Patrol . . . .Border Patrol agents have no part in enforcing laws that regulate highway use, and their activities have nothing
to do with an inquiry whether motorists and their vehicles are entitled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing highway usage, to
be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply that
state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct
such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding drivers'
licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters. 7

The Tenth Circuit seized on this language to buttress its reasoning in Lepinski. Thus the Tenth Circuit in Jenkins returned to
the clear holding of Lepinski, that state and local police agencies
may stop vehicles on a purely random, arbitrary basis, without
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, to check license and
registration papers."
The Tenth Circuit had a border patrol case of its own prior
to the three Supreme Court cases decided June 30, 1975.11 In
United States v. Martinez20 a border patrolman in New Mexico
was alerted by radio to watch for a car suspected of carrying
illegal aliens. The officer stopped the car, questioned the occupants briefly about their citizenship, and then lifted a blanket
covering the space between the seats where illegal aliens could be
hidden. The officer found only suitcases and clothing. Suddenly
Martinez drove off and soon thereafter threw a bag out the window. The officer found marijuana in the bag and later caught and
arrested Martinez. The court held that the officer had the authority to stop and make a limited investigation, and that Martinez'
flight and attempt to get rid of the marijuana were voluntary acts
which gave rise to probable cause.
422 U.S. at 833 n.8.

Justice Rehnquist indicated one possible legal basis for justifying arbitrary traffic
checks in his concurrence in Brignoni-Ponce:
[J]ust as travelers entering the country may be stopped and searched with0

out probable cause

. . .

a strong case may be made for those charged with

the enforcement of laws conditioningthe right of vehicular use of a highway
to likewise stop motorists using highways in order to determine whether they
have met the qualifications prescribed by applicable law for such use.
422 U.S. at 887 (emphasis added).
" See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
20 507

F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1974).
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The timeliness of information contained in an affidavit for a
search warrant was the issue in United States v. Rahn.' Rahn, a
former Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau investigator, had
been convicted of theft of government property-weapons seized
by the Bureau, which Rahn and his supervisor certified they had
destroyed. The supervisor was interrogated in July of 1973 and
said that in 1971 he and Rahn had agreed to take several of the
seized weapons. One of Rahn's fellow officers, not involved in the
scheme, remembered seeing Rahn in the fall of 1971 with a shotgun which resembled one supposedly destroyed. Further investigation disclosed that Rahn had not sold his weapons locally as
had his supervisor. Accordingly, the warrant to search Rahn's
residence was issued in July of 1973 and the weapons were found.
Rahn attacked the issuance because the information was over 18
months old2 and there was no probable cause to believe that he

still had the weapons at home. The court recounted the facts at
great length and found the magistrate was given sufficient probable cause to believe the weapons were at Rahn's residence. The
court expressed its policy in such cases as follows:
[W]e have given deference to the issuing magistrate's determination and have remembered that even doubtful cases are to be resolved largely by the preference to be given warrants.n

I.

A.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

Sufficiency of Indictment
The fifth amendment requires that a person charged with a
24

major crime be indicted by a grand jury. United States v. Curtis

dealt with the sufficiency of an indictment. The indictment alleged that Curtis had violated 18 U.S.C. § 134, the mail fraud
statute. The indictment was phrased almost entirely in the general language of the statute. The court held that the wording was
conclusory and did not give "any fair indication of the nature or
character of the scheme or artifice relied upon .... , As the
21

511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 96 S. Ct. 41 (1975).

On the issue of timeliness the court relied on Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206
(1932), and two of its own cases: United States v. Holliday, 474 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972).
2

" 511 F.2d at 294.
2, 506

F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 992. On the sufficiency and specificity needed in an indictment see Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
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defendant was without sufficient knowledge of the specific offenses charged, the court reversed the judgment and directed dismissal of the indictment."
B.

Double Jeopardy

In United States v. Leeds the defendant, an Indian convicted of robbery in Indian country, alleged that his arrest for
disorderly conduct by a tribal policeman, where this charge arose
out of the same set of occurrences as did the robbery, placed him
twice in jeopardy. The Tenth Circuit held that the arrest by the
tribal policeman, who was not a federal officer, was "manifestly
tribal in character ' 28 and that the tribal and federal charges were
therefore sufficiently different from one another so as not to con29
stitute double jeopardy.
In United States v. Worth"0 the defendant sold an informer
an illegal weapon, dynamite, and cocaine. The United States
brought charges against Worth for sale of the weapon and explosives, but Kansas charged him with the cocaine sale. Worth alleged that since the sales of dynamite and cocaine were contemporaneous, he was being tried twice for the same act. The court,
however, held the sales to be two acts, not one; therefore, each
sovereign could try one act without running afoul of the fifth
31
amendment.
C.

Self-incrimination
A frequent ground for appeal is that an accused who wants

" The court added that no trial court instruction could have overcome the fatal
insufficiency of the indictment. 506 F.2d at 992. Form 3 in the Appendix of Forms of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was mentioned favorably as providing a proper model
for an indictment. Id. at 987.
505 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 163 n.2. The court distinguished Leeds from United States v. Keeble, 459
F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 412 U.S. 205 (1973). In Keeble the officer
was both a federal officer and a tribal officer.
" The court also held that just as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which
requires federal suspects to be brought quickly before a magistrate, does not apply to
federal suspects already in state custody, neither does rule 5(a) apply to federal suspects
already in tribal custody. 505 F.2d at 163.
* 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974).
a'Id. at 1210. The fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387 (1970); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Justice Brennan, concurring in Ashe,
expressed his preference for the "same transaction" test. Id. at 448. On the multiple-acts,
single-transaction issue in the Tenth Circuit, see Robinson v. United States, 366 F.2d 575,
579 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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to testify as to only one of several matters at trial is forced into a
dilemma: Either he remains completely silent, or he testifies and
opens all the other matters to cross-examination.
In the case just discussed, United States v. Worth,32 Worth's
defense to the federal charge of illegal sale of explosives was entrapment. If he testified on the entrapment issue, he would have
to admit the sale of explosives. This admission of a sale at a
certain time and place could be used against him in the later state
trial for sale of cocaine at the same time and place. The Tenth
Circuit held that the choice was his to make, but that it was not
impermissible to force him to choose.13 Further, the court said
that it was not essential for Worth to take the stand in order to
34
rely on the entrapment defense.
A similar dilemma confronted the defendant in United
35
States v. Philipps.
Philipps was charged with a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2114, assault with intent to rob a mail carrier. Because
he placed the mail carrier's life in jeopardy, he was given 25 years,
the stiffer penalty provided for in section 2114. First, Philipps
said that section 2114 actually creates two separate offenses. The
court held that the stiffer penalty for jeopardizing a mail carrier's
life (or wounding him) was not a separate offense, but only an
aggravating circumstance. Second, Philipps claimed that he
could not take the stand to testify concerning the aggravating
circumstance without subjecting himself to cross-examination on
the basic robbery offense; i.e., that he could not testify concerning
punishment without being forced to testify concerning guilt. The
court held that the choice was not constitutionally impermissi37
ble .
The validity of a confession made by an American citizen
3.2 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974).

Id. at 1209-10.
Id. at 1209. This is consistent with an earlier holding this past year. On the entire
issue of entrapment see United States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). Hawke expanded upon an earlier Tenth Circuit analysis of
the thorny entrapment defense, Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
35 522 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 610.
3 Id. at 611. The court relied upon Kirk v. United States, 457 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 987 (1972), which relied upon Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183
(1971). (Crampton was vacated by the Supreme Court, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), but only
insofar as the death penalty was concerned, because of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).)
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while in custody in a foreign country was questioned in two cases,
United States v. Mundt" and Cranford v. Rodriguez. 9 The court
joined several other circuits" by holding the confessions valid
where the trial courts had found the confessions to be voluntary.
In Mundt, although an American narcotics agent had been
involved in the investigation which culminated in Mundt's arrest
in Peru, the confession was made to a Peruvian officer. The Peruvian officer did not give Mundt the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona.4 The court agreed with the trial court that since the
Peruvian was not an agent of the American officer, there was
insufficient reason to exclude the confession. 2
In Cranford the confession was made to a New Mexico officer
across the border in Juarez, Mexico. Cranford had been given
Miranda rights and a waiver form; the standard language had
been altered by crossing out the reference to appointment of an
attorney and inserting instead a reference to the accused's right
to talk to an American consular officer. The alteration was made
because Mexico law does not give a right to counsel at that stage
of the criminal process. The court found "a good faith effort to
comply with the Miranda doctrine"4 3 under the circumstances.
The test for admissibility in both Mundt and Cranford was
one of voluntariness; American participation did not in itself
taint the confessions fatally, even though the Miranda warnings
were not given as they would have been in the United States. The
issue of voluntariness was submitted to a full hearing at the trial
level in both cases. Cranford, whose original trial was in state
court, was denied an evidentiary hearing on his habeas corpus
action in federal court. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's reviewing only the state court's transcript.44
38 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
31 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975).

1oSee, e.g., United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972) (confession made in
the Bahamas); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1971) (Mexico); United
States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mexico); United States v. Nagelberg, 434
F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971) (Canada).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'2 508 F.2d at 906-07.
'
512 F.2d at 863. While the Tenth Circuit assumed that the Miranda doctrine still
applies outside the United States, the Second Circuit in United States v. Nagelberg, 434
F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971), said that it did not.
Still, both courts found the admission of the incriminating statements valid.
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court has the discretion to hold a new
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Voluntariness was also the issue in United States v.
Crocker." Crocker had confessed both orally and in writing to
passing counterfeit money, and had done so after twice waiving
in writing her right to have an attorney. She claimed that the
burden of proof was placed on her during the suppression hearing,
rather than on the government as Mirandamandates." The court
held that while the burden is on the government to prove that the
Miranda rights were waived voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, there is also a burden on the accused:
Logic dictates that a pre-trial Motion to Suppress filed by an accused does in fact cast the burden upon the movant to present facts
necessary to sustain his position. 7

III.

TRIAL MATTERS

A. Jury Selection
Randomness of jury selection was at issue in United States
v. Davis." When it came time to pick the 12th juror, only two
veniremen remained of the original courtroom pool. Davis
claimed that picking either one would not be "random." This
sophistic argument was quickly rejected by the Tenth Circuit,
which held that the "essence of randomness

. . .

is not number,

but the absence of any arbitrary attempt to exclude a class of
persons from the jury."49 The court stated the policy succinctly:
hearing, but is only compelled to grant one if "the constitutional issues had not been fully
tried in state court or [if] there existed relevant evidence which was not presented." 512
F.2d at 862. The court pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) and two well-known Supreme
Court cases: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
,5510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
"

384 U.S. at 475.

510 F.2d at 1135, citing Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955). The
measure for establishing voluntariness is preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
Crocker also discussed whether the guidelines for determining voluntariness had to
be those in Miranda, or could also be those in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970), passed after
Miranda in order to ameliorate the harm Congress thought Mirandahad caused. 510 F.2d
at 1136-38. The court indicated that, although the Supreme Court had not passed expressly on the constitutionality of section 3501, it interpreted several recent Supreme
Court decisions to uphold impliedly section 3501. Id. In any event, the Tenth Circuit also
found the suppression hearing met the Miranda guidelines. Even if the section 3501
discussion is technically dictum, the Tenth Circuit position is clear: A confession meeting
the section 3501 guidelines on voluntariness can be validly admitted.
48518 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1975). Randomness is required in federal juries by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-74 (1970).
" 518 F.2d at 82, citing Sitarski v. New York, 358 F. Supp. 817, 820 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
The Sitarski court cited Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Hoyt said that an unreasona-
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"The selection of each of the jurors is guaranteed 'random' so long
as formation of the pool is nondiscriminatory."50
B.

Trial Court Discretion

United States v. Stoker5 dealt with the number of subpoenas
available to an indigent defendant.52 Stoker applied for 16 subpoenas, in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(b), 5 3 on the last day of the Government's case. The trial court
granted him only four. The Tenth Circuit limited its review of the
issue to the question of possible abuse of discretion by the trial
54
court and found none.
Another issue of discretion arose in United States v.
Connor.55 Connor was charged with interstate transportation of a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Of his several
prior felony convictions, the Government chose to prove a rape
conviction because it was recent and from the state where the
federal trial was being held. Connor offered to stipulate that he
had been previously convicted of a felony. The trial court allowed
proof of the rape conviction. The Tenth Circuit held that this was
a matter of discretion for the trial judge."
Sequestration of a rowdy defendant was the issue in United
ble exclusion of a particular group from jury service was improper, but also upheld a
Florida scheme which placed women on jury lists only if they so requested. That part of
Hoyt approving the exclusion or automatic exemption of women from jury service was
overruled in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Taylor is not retroactive. Daniel v.
Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
518 F.2d at 82.
522 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1975).
The right to compulsory process is guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
The rule requires "a satisfactory showing that the defendant is financially unable
to pay the fees of the witness and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an
adequate defense."
11The court cited several of its recent cases on trial court discretion. 522 F.2d at 578.
Abuse of the trial court's discretion has been the standard of review for over 80 years.
Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891).
No. 74-1385 (10th Cir., July 9, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
The court repeated the general rule that a party is not required to stipulate and
may insist upon proving its facts. However, it emphatically denied that the Government
had an "absoluteright to refuse any offer by a defendant to stipulate to facts in a criminal
proceeding." Id. at 3. The court said that the trial judge, in his discretion, could direct
the Government to stipulate. Id. at 2.
The court also provided a practical pointer. The proper way to prove a conviction is
to introduce a certified copy of the conviction and have an official of the prison identify
in court the defendant as the one named in the conviction. Id. at 3. See United States v.
McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 449 (10th Cir. 1972).
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States v. Munn." Munn was ordered sequestered, during jury
selection, in the marshal's office where he could still hear the
proceedings. He was also given an opportunity to confer with his
counsel from time to time.
The trial judge kept Munn out until jury selection was over
and three minor witnesses had been called. Munn was gone only
about 1/4 hours. He contended that the Supreme Court's authoritative statements on in-court discipline in Illinois v. Allen58 required his return to the courtroom immediately upon his giving
his promise to behave. The Court said in Allen:
Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon
as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the
decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial
proceedings.5'

The Tenth Circuit did not read the "as soon as" language to
require absolutely the return of the defendant to the courtroom
at the earliest possible time. Rather, the judge must be allowed
to exercise some discretion in deciding whether the defendant's
promise to behave is sincere. 0
C.

Closing Arguments

Government prosecutors came under considerable fire for
prejudicial statements in their closing arguments. In United
States v. Ludwig6 l the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of his
police witnesses. The court held that this was clear and prejudi62
cial error, and reversed and remanded the case.
The prosecutor in United States v. Worth 3 referred to a drug
sale for which the defendant would soon be on trial in state court
507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975).
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
' d. at 343.
507 F.2d at 568. In Allen, a few paragraphs after the language quoted in the text,
the Supreme Court said the following about discretion:
We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the
circumstances of each case.
397 U.S. at 343.
508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974).
62 Id. at 143. For a forceful statement of Tenth Circuit policy on vouching for the
V

credibility of witnesses, see United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1973).

See also 3

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 525 (12th ed. 1975).

505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the double jeopardy and entrapment issues in Worth, see notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
63
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and added about the drug itself: "And he transferred a vial of
cocaine, a hard narcotic. And I can't say enough bad about cocaine and I can't say enough bad about people who would sell
it."4 The Tenth Circuit condemned the language, but also pro-

vided a lesson for defense counsel: Since there was no timely
objection to the inflammatory remarks, there was no reversal. 5
In United States v. Latimer" the prosecutor literally testified
in his closing argument that the reason the Government did not
introduce the film of a bank robbery was that the camera malfunctioned. There had been testimony that the camera had been
activated, but nothing more. Defense counsel properly argued the
inference that the film did not identify the accused. The prosecutor should have shown the film so that the jurors could have seen
the camera had malfunctioned, or simply allowed the inference
to stand. But, by going outside the record and expressing his
personal knowledge and beliefs, he overstepped the boundaries of
proper argument. Since there had been timely objection, the case
was reversed and remanded."
D. Principaland Accessory
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to discuss an element
of criminal law in United States v. Tokoph 5 Tokoph was accused
of aiding and abetting one Weil in misapplying bank funds by
receiving illegal loans. Tokoph contended that since Weil, the
principal, had not been convicted of the substantive offense, he
505 F.2d at 1211.
Id. This lesson has been taught by the Tenth Circuit before. United States v.
Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1971); McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21,
24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964). Where there is no timely objection, the
only chance for a reversal lies in a finding of "plain error." Van Nattan v. United States,
357 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1966). Accord, Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 736 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962); Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491, 502 (7th
Cir. 1934).
511 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 503. See also United States v. Peak, 498 F.2d 1337, 1338-39 (6th Cir. 1974);
Reichert v. United States, 359 F.2d 278, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1806, 1807 (3d ed. 1940).
Latimer drew a rare dissent, this one by Judge Hill, who was of the opinion that under
the circumstances the error was trivial; that defense counsel knew why the camera malfunctioned and took unfair advantage by arguing an inference he knew was logical but
factually untrue; and that Latimer had had a fair trial, although not a "perfect" one. 511
F.2d at 503-04.
514 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1975).
"

'5

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 53

(Tokoph) could not be convicted as an accessory. The Tenth Circuit correctly pointed out the distinction between proving the
principal's guilt and convicting him. 9 Although Weil had not yet
been tried, there was sufficient evidence to show that he had
committed the offense and that Tokoph had aided and abetted
him.
IV.

A.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Mental Competence

The issue in United States v. Munz 0 was the standard for a
jury's judging the defendant's mental competence. The trial
judge had repeatedly said that the difference between mental
competence and incompetence was whether the defendant was
acting voluntarily or was driven by an "insane delusion." The
Tenth Circuit rejected this "insane delusion" language and expressed a strong preference for the language used in one of its
earlier cases, United States v. Wion.'
" The defendant relied heavily on United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973). The Seventh Circuit said: "The presupposition
that an aider and abettor may be convicted . . . absent conviction of the principal is
invalid." Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added). The court then cited Giragosian v. United
States, 349 F.2d 166 (lst Cir. 1965), and United States v. Caplan, 123 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.
Pa. 1954), in support of its holding. However, a reading of the two cases discloses that
the Seventh Circuit erred in its interpretation of and reliance upon those cases.
Giragosianheld:
In order to convict Giragosian of aiding and abetting it was necessary for the
Government to prove that [the principal] himself was guilty of the primary
offense ....
349 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added), citing Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664 (1896). The
Tenth Circuit correctly noted the distinction between guilt of the principal (Giragosian)
and conviction of the principal (Stevison).
Caplan furnishes no support for Stevison either. In fact, the proof requirement is even
less in Caplan than in Giragosianand Tokoph: "The proof must establish that the offense
was committed by someone and that defendant aided and abetted in its commission." 123
F. Supp. at 865 (emphasis added). Proving an offense has been committed is much easier
than proving that a particular person, the principal, committed the offense.
The Seventh Circuit would have been right several centuries ago:
At common law an accessary cannot be tried without his consent before the
conviction or outlawry of the principal except where tried together with him;
the rule, however, has been changed by statute in many jurisdictions.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 104 (1961) (emphasis added).
The current general rule, which is that applied by the Tenth Circuit, is stated as
follows: "Ordinarily, the guilt of the principal must be proved in order to convict an
accessary." Id. § 105 (emphasis added).
7- 504 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
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Wion adopted the A.L.I. standard on criminal responsibility,
which provided that the test of mental competence was whether
the accused lacked a "substantial capacity" to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act."2 The test used by the trial judge was
essentially whether the accused had no capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act. Because of the emphasis by the trial
judge on "insane delusions" and the possibility of seriously misleading the jury due to the way some expert testimony was
phrased, the court found substantial prejudice to the defendant's
rights and reversed and remanded."
B.

Reasonable Doubt

Within the last 2 years the Tenth Circuit has made clear its
preference for a particular definition of "reasonable doubt."' 4 The
question arose most recently in United States v. Leaphart.5 Once
again the circuit court approved the definition of "reasonable
doubt" as "the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act." 8 And once again the court expressed its
displeasure with an instruction couched in positive rather than
negative terms. The criticized instruction read:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is established if the evidence is
such as a reasonably prudent man would be willing to rely and act
upon in the most important of his own affairs."

The "hesitate to act" language received the most authoritative approval from the Supreme Court in Holland v. United
5 The Tenth Circuit has since followed
States."
Holland in United
States v. Smaldone" and United States v. Pepe. 0 Although it has
not reversed a case using the "willing to act" instruction, because
72 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0 (1962 Proposed Final Draft). For a short discussion

of the A.L.I. and other tests, see W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §
38 (1972). Almost all of the federal courts of appeals have accepted the A.L.I. test. Id.
§ 38, at 294 n.78.
7 504 F.2d at 1208-09.
7 United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Smaldone,
485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). See discussion of
Smaldone and Pepe in Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 158-59 (1975).
7 513 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1975).
7' Id. at 750 n.1 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 749 (emphasis added). This was part of the instruction used at Leaphart's
trial.
.' 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), aff'g 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1954).
79 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
- 501 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1974).
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it is not seriously misleading to the jury, it is clear that the Tenth
Circuit expects a change in the trial courts:
The time has unquestionably arrived after Holland, Smaldone,
and Pepe for the trial courts to change this instruction and to couch
it in the terms prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States2
V.

A.

POST-TRIAL MATTERS

Sentencing

The doctrine of merger was applied in United States v.
Munn,8" where the defendant had been sentenced for both larceny
and robbery, each arising from the same episode. The Government agreed that the larceny was merged into the robbery, and
the court vacated the sentence on the larceny conviction.u
The court in Mayfield v. United States 4 joined several other
circuits 5 in holding that the imposition of a statutorily mandated
special 2-year parole term is an imposition of a sentence; therefore, the defendant is required to be present. 8
Consistent with two decisions last year, 7 the Tenth Circuit
has held in Garcia v. United States8 8 that there is no need to
inform a defendant who pleads guilty that there is a possibility
of consecutive sentences, where the defendant actually knew of
that possibility. No special language about consecutive sentences
is absolutely required.
l

513 F.2d at 750.

2 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975). For a discussion of

sequestration in Munn, see text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
" Id. at 569. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796-98 (1969); Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957); United States v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th
Cir. 1970).
'
504 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1974).
The court in Mayfield cited the following cases in support of its holding: Thompson

v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (1st Cir. 1974); Tanner v. United States, 493 F.2d
1350, 1351 (5th Cir. 1974); Caille v. United States, 487 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1972).
" FED. R. CRuM. P. 43. The one exception to the requirement of presence is when there
is a reduction in sentence. FED. R. CraM. P. 35.

"' Wall v. United States, 500 F.2d 38 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1025 (1975);
Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of consecutive
sentences and these cases, see Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 139-41 (1975).
No. 74-1428 (10th Cir., Dec. 10, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
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Time to Appeal-Extensions

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires that defendants wishing to appeal in criminal cases must file a notice of
appeal within 10 days after entry of judgment. Upon a showing
of excusable neglect, that period can be extended 30 days. In
United States v. Connor 9 the notice of appeal arrived in the mail
after the initial 10-day period, but within the additional 30-day
period which could have been granted. The trial judge held there
was no excusable neglect, even though the notice was mailed
within the initial 10-day period and took 5 days to be delivered
in Cheyenne, the same city where it was mailed. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge abused his discretion. The question
then became whether the trial court could enter an order after the
30-day period had expired, even though the notice arrived during
the 30-day period. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had
that power.9"
C.

Expunction of Arrest Record

United States v. Linn9 ' faced squarely the issue whether the
fact of an acquittal by itself is enough to mandate expunction of
the defendant's arrest record. The court held that while courts do
have the power to expunge after acquittal, mere acquittal alone
is not sufficient to warrant an expunction." However, when extreme circumstances warrant, expunction is proper and avail-

able .13
D.

Prisoners'Rights
Following is a brief discussion of several cases brought by

" No. 74-1651 (10th Cir., May 12, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Accord, C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 397 F.2d 952, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1968).
The court also cited Johnson v. United States, 405 F.2d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Reed
v. Michigan, 398 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1968); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir.
1966).
513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 63 (1975).
3 Accord, United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Okla. 1974); United
States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp.
804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'" See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967). Linn noted that some of the cases
call for a "balancing" of the equities between the Government's need to
maintain extensive records in order to aid in general law enforcement and
the individual's right of privacy.
513 F.2d at 927.
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prisoners incarcerated in federal and state institutions. In the
wake of a recent Supreme Court case, Wolff v. McDonnell,94
which clarified what due process rights prisoners do and do not
have in prison disciplinary actions, inmates in the six-state area
encompassed by the Tenth Circuit challenged many existing
prison disciplinary procedures. In Shimabaku v. Britton" it was
held that in a disciplinary proceeding a prisoner who was charged
with an infraction which might also be a crime was entitled to
''use immunity" in any subsequent criminal action; there was
thus no constitutional dilemma involving self-incrimination if he
were forced to testify at the hearing." Several other cases," based
on due process rights protected in Wolff, failed because the Supreme Court specifically stated that its decision was not retroactive .
In two cases prisoners had alleged that conditions within the
prison were so poor as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. In Gregory v. Wyse 9
the court found that solitary confinement per se was not cruel and
unusual punishment, even with a hard bed, cramped quarters,
continuous light, and other restrictions. The second case,
Poindexter v. Woodson, 00° limited the remedies available to victims of cruel and unusual punishment: No money damages were
allowed where there was no showing of malice. 9 '
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
" 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 44-45.
g Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1975), and five unpublished Tenth
Circuit opinions: Collingwood v. Meacham, No. 73-1749 (July 17, 1975); Foor v. Carlson,
No. 73-1804 (Dec. 10, 1974); Johnson v. Britton, No. 73-1672 (Dec. 9, 1974); Haas v.
Attorney General, No. 74-1130 (Oct. 30, 1974); Black v. Warden, No. 73-1586 (Oct. 30,
1974).
11 418 U.S. at 573-74.
512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1975).
510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
'i"
The cruel and unusual punishment was inflicted upon several alleged prison rioters
and included lengthy stays in "strip cells." Since these cells had been used in the past,
the court felt it unfair to hold current prison officials liable for what had just been
determined to be a constitutional violation. Thus, the officials were granted qualified
immunity; on this topic see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Dissents in the Tenth Circuit are quite rare, but this case drew one from Judge Doyle.
He felt that the officials had not acted in good faith and that the violation was one which
shocked the conscience, and that, therefore, immunity should not be extended. 510 F.2d
at 467.
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Mail censorship was the issue in two unpublished opinions:
0 ° and Berry v.
Kennedy v. State Department of Corrections'
0
3
Anderson. The court in Kennedy remanded to the Wyoming
district court for a determination as to whether a Wyoming rule
prohibiting inmates from writing articles for publication furthered any substantial governmental interest. The district court
in Berry enjoined Oklahoma officials from refusing to mail
Berry's letters, but denied him monetary damages. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, as no injury had been shown.'
There were several cases involving sentencing, probation,
and parole. The cases and their holdings, briefly stated, follow:
United States v. Giles:"°5 The Tenth Circuit will not review
a sentence if it is within statutory limits.
United States v. Johnson:06 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 cannot be used to attack the validity of a conviction; rule
35 can only be used to reduce or correct a sentence.
United States v. Reynolds:0 7 The trial court was held to have
abused its discretion when it extended the length of probation
without informing the probationers of their alleged violations and
without making specific findings.
Patrick v. Britton:0 A probationer is entitled to a local revocation hearing, in order to secure witnesses and present a proper
defense.
Sanchez-Hernandez v. Daggett:0 9 There is no set rule in the
Tenth Circuit requiring a meaningful parole hearing to be held
no later than one-third of the way through a sentence.
Mower v. Britton:"0 The Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh
Circuit"' in applying the Administrative Procedure Act"' to pa12

No. 74-1564 (10th Cir., Mar. 27, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).

'13No.

74-1491 (10th Cir., July 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I On the issue of mail censorship and prisons, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974). Censorship is only one of many issues in a long, well-documented case involving the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424-25 (E.D.
Okla. 1974).
No. 74-1527 (10th Cir., Mar. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 75-1013 (10th Cir., July 8, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
07 No. 74-1753 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 74-1874 (10th Cir., May 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 75-1120 (10th Cir., May 15, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974).
King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
1125 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
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role hearings conducted by the United States Board of Parole.
This decision was expressly made non-retroactive.
Habeas corpus naturally was at issue in several cases, discussed briefly below:
Sanders v. Conine:"3 Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for
a prisoner challenging the validity of his extradition.
Jenkins v. Atkins:" 4 That a state court did not deal with one
crucial issue in a case does not require repetitious exhaustion of
state remedies if the issue was tendered to the state court."'
United States v. Hereford:"' If an indigent prisoner is only
contemplating a federal habeas corpus" 7 or other action but has
not yet filed, he is not entitled to a free transcript."'
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has held in Henderson v. Secretary of Corrections"9 that a prisoner for whom corrective shoes
were prescribed but not furnished does not have a right of action
for damages:
We cannot say that the inadequacy of appellant's normal shoes or
the omission to provide the corrective shoes gives rise to a constitutional deprivation sustaining a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim nor that
appellant could elaborate this set of facts to support a claim which
would entitle him to relief.'1
VI.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

21 U. S.C. § 802(15)

A.

This section defines marijuana as Cannabissativa L. In two
2
cases, United States v. Ludwig' ' and United States v. Spann,'1
506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974).
515 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1975).
,, The court mentioned two Supreme Court cases involving exhaustion of administrative remedies: Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
"I No. 75-1116 (10th Cir., May 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
Contra, MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth
Circuit made one practical point in its decision to grant transcripts to indigents prior to
their filing section 2255 actions: It often costs less to furnish the transcript than to go into
court and fight the prisoner's motion for a free transcript. Id. at 1123. For cases in accord
with the Tenth Circuit, see id. at 1118.
"'
518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1975).
""
Id. at 695. On the issue of medical care for prisoners, the court has previously said:
"The prisoner's right is to medical care-not to the type or scope of medical care which
he personally desires." Id., quoting Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968).
21 508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974).
515 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1975).
"

'"
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the defendants claimed that marijuana consists of three distinct
species- Cannabis sativa L., Cannabis indica, and Cannabis
ruderalis. The Government proved only that "marijuana" was
found in both cases. Defendants argued that the Government's
case, therefore, had to fail, since there was no proof that the
marijuana seized was of the one type outlawed. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, as have most courts confronted with
it. 13
As far as the Tenth Circuit is concerned, marijuana is marijuana is marijuana.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 660
This statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever ... being an employee of [a corporation engaged in commerce as a] common carrier riding in or upon any railroad car,
motortruck, steamboat, vessel, aircraft or other vehicle of such carrier moving in interstate commerce, embezzles, steals, abstracts, or
willfully misapplies, any of the moneys. . . arising or accruing from
. . . such commerce . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
In United States v. Tye" 4 the court held that a person

who
drove a truck wholly within the state of Kansas, where the truck
carried C.O.D. packages from outside Kansas, was within the
class of persons Congress intended to cover. A recent district
court case, on the other hand, held that where a vehicle was only
driven intrastate,the fact that it carried goods moving interstate
did not bring any misapplication of funds within section 660.125
It is unclear whether the expansive Tenth Circuit interpretation or the narrow district court interpretation is correct; the
statute is unfortunately ambiguous enough to support both interpretations.
C.

18 US.C. §844(f)
This section, in pertinent part, provides:
'2

The cases are collected in United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1975);

those in accord with Ludwig and Spann are id. at 204 n.12, and those not in accord are
id. at 203 n.11. Walton itself is in accord; its reasoning is grounded on the interpretation
that, since all species of marijuana contain the active ingredient tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), Congress meant to outlaw all species.
"' 519 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Reca, 355 F. Supp. 334 (D.P.R. 1973). Accord, Shaver v. United
States, 174 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1949). But cf. United States v. Kimball, 441 F.2d 505 (10th
Cir. 1971).
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Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage
or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
personal or real property in whole or in part owned, possessed, or
used by, or leased to, the United States, any department or agency
thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial
assistance shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or fined
not more than $10,000, or both ....

The defendant in United States v. Apodaca2 ' was convicted
under this statute for dynamiting a Fremont County, Wyoming,
sheriff's car. The sheriff's department received federal financial
assistance in the following manner: The Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration provided funds to the state Governor's Planning Committee on Criminal Administration, which
in turn passed on funds to Fremont County, which finally passed
on funds to the sheriff's department. The court held that the
intermediary agencies were mere conduits of federal funds and
not distributors of state funds. Since the dynamited car belonged
to the sheriffs department and the department was an organization receiving federal funds, there was federal jurisdiction. That
the funds did not buy the property destroyed by the explosive was
no impediment; any property owned by the organization is covered. ' 7
Richard F. Currey
SEARCHES FOR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT

Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975)
By WILLIAM A. BIANco*
I.

THE PROBLEM

At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Friday, October 22, 1971, six
"'

522 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1975).

"n

This extremely broad view of federal jurisdiction under section 844(f) first ap-

peared in a district court case several months before Apodaca. United States v. Brown,
384 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The defendant was convicted of blowing up a
planned parenthood clinic which received Federal Health, Education, and Welfare funds
through the Southeast Michigan Family Project, a non-profit Michigan corporation.
Brown quoted from the legislative history of section 844 and concluded that Congress
intended that a broad meaning be given the term "Federal financial assistance." Id. at
1154.
* Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1967, New York
University; J.D., 1970, Columbia University.
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or eight agents of the Internal Revenue Service arrived at the
office of Dr. Wendell Shaffer, a Colorado Springs dentist in practice by himself. The agents served a search warrant on the doctor
and began a 7-hour examination of his office, including file cabinets, desk drawers, and closets. The warrant authorized a search
for
certain property, namely fiscal records relating to the income and
expenses of Dr. Wendell L. Shaffer from his dental practice and
other sources from January 1, 1966 to December 31, 1970, including,
but not limited to, dental patient cards, appointment books, cash
receipt books, cash disbursement books, expense records, business
ledgers, log books, bank ledger sheets and statements, deposit tickets, cancelled checks, purchase invoices, copies of receipts covering
payment of fees, copies of invoices and bills.

.

.

. an approximately

51/2" by 7",-paper pad-allegedly, known as a "cheat book"....1

The agents emerged with some 18 cartons of records, which were
seized pursuant to the warrant.
Subsequent to the seizure, Dr. Shaffer and his wife filed an
action seeking the return of their property, the suppression of any
evidence, as well as injunctive relief and damages. The trial
court rejected the Shaffers' claim that their fourth and fifth
amendment rights had been violated, and granted summary
judgment for the Government, holding that the search and seizure was proper and that the Shaffers were not entitled to damages.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Shaffers contended that:
(1) the seizure of the private papers of a dentist practising as a sole
practitioner violated his privilege against self-incrimination; and (2)
the search and seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'

In an opinion by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit held that the
warrant was properly issued and limited in scope to certain described business records.' The court disposed of the Shaffers' fifth
amendment argument with the terse remark:
Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 180 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-601).
2 The action was filed pursuant to rule 41(e) Fed. R. Crim. P. and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.

523 F.2d at 177.
Id.
Id. at 179-80. The court also noted that the warrant was predicated upon the supporting affidavits of three of the doctor's former employees to whom he had allegedly
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There is no violation of one's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by reason of the proper execution of a valid search
and seizure.5

In making this statement the court implicitly rejected the
thesis of an "intimate relation" between the fourth and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution, a doctrine that
was born nearly a century ago in Boyd v. United States,' and
often cited since.
The court did not focus on historical or, for the most part,
policy arguments in its analysis of this question, but looked
primarily to the presence of "compulsion" in the production of
the Shaffers' documents. Though the "compulsion" test may be
no more than a shorthand method of considering whether fifth
amendment problems are raised, it is not the most useful or decisive analytical approach.
Judge Seth, in a lengthy and vigorous dissent, argued that
the search was unreasonable and in violation of the fourth
amendment. He further asserted that the warrant permitting the
seizure of personal records compelled the Shaffers to become witnesses against themselves in violation of the fifth amendment.7
5
Judge Seth, like the Shaffers, relied heavily on Hill v. Philpott,
in which the Seventh Circuit held a search by the IRS for documents to be in violation of the fifth amendment.' Judge Seth's
bragged about his cheating on income tax returns. The former employees identified with
specificity at least some of the documents sought. Id.
The opinion of the court may arguably be construed to mean that the court would
find only warrantless searches unreasonable under the fourth amendment: "The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only an unreasonable search undertaken without a warrant." Id.
at 179. It is doubtful, however, that the court intended by this remark to approve without
more all searches made pursuant to warrants. Cf. In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 276 (1975), where the court considered the requirements under the
fourth amendment for a reasonable subpoena duces tecum. Further, the court noted in
Shaffer: "We readily agree that a general search warrant does not afford 'carte blanche'
to seize all records, personal and business." Id. at 177.

523 F.2d at 179.
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
523 F.2d at 184.
445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
The Seventh Circuit, in Hill, was faced with a fact situation almost identical to that
in Shaffer. The Seventh Circuit did not reach the fourth amendment question but found
that the compulsory search for documentary evidence of tax evasion was indistinguishable, in legal and practical effect, from a subpoena to produce the same documents.
Such a subpoena, the Seventh Circuit noted, would have been expressly prohibited by
Boyd as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 445 F.2d at 149. Cf. Vonder-

1976

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

position appears to be that the fourth and fifth amendments are
intertwined and that the very examination of certain documents
in the course of an otherwise valid search results in a violation of
both the fourth and fifth amendments. He reached this conclusion in part by finding "compulsion" an implicit part of any
search pursuant to warrant. Judge Seth plainly reveals his distress at the extent and nature of the IRS search in Shaffer. His
opinion is an emotional reminder-or warning-that we ought
not forget the principles upon which this nation was founded.
That reminder should not go unheeded. Nor should it obscure an
analytical review of what those fundamentals were in the beginning, or how they may have developed and been interpreted in
200 years. The dissenting opinion is not without support, as Boyd
and Hill demonstrate, but the arguments raised simply do not
justify an interpretation of the fifth amendment as protecting
most, if not all, documents from government scrutiny.
Because space here is limited and because questions of fact
must necessarily be involved, the fourth amendment question of
the reasonableness of the search of the Shaffer office and the
breadth of the warrant will not be discussed here. Rather, the
more troublesome (and more interesting) question of the relationship of the fourth and fifth amendments, and any resulting extension of the privilege against self-incrimination to documents, will
be explored. That exploration will include a look at the Boyd case
and the validity of the "intimate relationship" doctrine; a consideration of the policies behind the fifth amendment and how those
policies relate to documentary evidence; and, finally, a review of
the Supreme Court's approach to self-incrimination and the relationship of that approach to documentary evidence.
II.

Boyd

AND THE "INTIMATE RELATION" DoCTRINE'0

Boyd involved a suit by the Government to confiscate plate
glass allegedly imported in violation of the customs laws. To establish the Government's case, Boyd was ordered to produce an
Ahe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974) (similar facts; search held unreasonable on
fourth amendment grounds only); United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (worksheets of gambler seized; held, no violation of fifth
amendment); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.) (seizure
of letter as evidence of defendant's participation in narcotics conspiracy; held, no violation
of the fifth amendment).
0 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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invoice related to the importation of the glass. The order was
issued under a statute which specifically provided that subpoenas
could issue to develop the evidence necessary for prosecutions
pursuant to the customs laws." Were production refused, the
Government's allegations would be taken as confessed. 2 An earlier statute had permitted the seizure of documents pursuant to
3
warrant rather than their production by subpoena.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley,
roundly condemned the order for production as a violation of both
the fourth and fifth amendments." The Court asserted that compelled testimony and compelled examinations of private papers
were improper in light of the history of the fourth and fifth
amendments, which were intended to prevent invasions by the
government "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life."' 5 It was in this sense that the Court noted "the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other."'"
Although the question of a search of private papers pursuant
to a warrant was not before the Court, the majority's position on
that related question was clear:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial
purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."

Justice Bradley relied heavily on Lord Camden's decision in
Act To Amend The Customs Revenue Laws And To Repeal Moieties of 1874, ch.
391, 18 Stat. 186.
12 Id. ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187. For an excellent discussion of the Boyd case, see J.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 49-61 (1966).
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 188, § 2, 14 Stat. 547.
" The Court said:
[W]e are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit
is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and
seizure-and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
116 U.S. at 634-35.
"5Id. at 630.
LANDYNSKI,
"

IId.
"

Id. at 635.
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5 The Entick
the landmark English case, Entick v. Carrington."
case and the circumstances out of which it arose do, indeed, lie
at the heart of the American and English privileges against unreasonable search. It may not, however, mean all that the Court
in Boyd asserted.
John Entick, whose house had been searched and private
papers examined on the authority of a general warrant issued by
the Secretary of State in an attempt to discover libelous matter,
brought suit for damages against those who had conducted the
search. Lord Camden, considering the validity of the general
search warrant which had been used as a possible justification for
what would otherwise have been a trespass, held the warrant to
be unauthorized and condemned general searches for evidence of
the type permitted by the warrant:

In the criminal law, such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet
there are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery,
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no papersearch in these cases to help forward the conviction. Whether this
proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from
a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the
innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain
that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent
as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would
seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty."

The dictum of Lord Camden in Entick was ultimately incorporated into the dictum of Justice Bradley in Boyd. The Boyd
thesis that unreasonable searches often compelled selfincrimination and that compulsory self-incrimination "throws
light on" the meaning of unreasonable search"0 was purportedly
derived directly from the quoted language in Entick. But a link
between the fourth and fifth amendments and the resulting invalidity of document searches was neither a necessary nor logical
conclusion from Entick. It has been suggested that Lord Camden
sought only to argue that innocent and guilty alike would be
harmed by unreasonable searches, just as they would be harmed
"

19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765).

"

19 Howell St. Tr. at 1073, as quoted by Justice Bradley, 116 U.S. at 629.

116 U.S. at 633.
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by compulsory self-incrimination. It was a comparison of like
policy considerations, and no more. 2'
Nor did the Court in Boyd recognize that Lord Camden's ire
was aroused by the unlawful issuance and general character of the
warrant and not from any compulsory incrimination. One commentator has aptly noted:
Justice Bradley's reliance on Lord Camden's words in the Entick case to justify a doctrine of interrelationship between the two
amendments was not well placed, for the Entick opinion proves
nothing of the sort. In order to determine the existence of a trespass,
it was necessary for Lord Camden to establish the illegality of the
warrant authorizing the seizure of Entick's papers. Lord Camden
found that since the general warrant had received no recognition in
common law and Parliament had not authorized it, legal authority
for its issuance did not exist. The thrust of his opinion was directed
to the generality of the warrant, the fact that its issuance was
grounded in mere suspicion and not based on probable cause. It was
in this connection that Lord Camden stressed the self-incrimination
analogy. Compulsory self-incrimination was not permitted by law
because it would hurt "the innocent as well as the guilty ...
[S]earch for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then,
too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty . . . . [I]f
suspicion at large should be a ground of search . . .whose house
would be safe?"

Significantly, the paragraph in Entick containing the last quoted
sentence was omitted by Justice Bradley. The sentence clarifies
the analogy and places in doubt the underpinning of the purported relationship between the two amendments. 3
However this conflict may be resolved, the Entick case need
not and should not be read as broadly as Justice Bradley's dictum
in Boyd would suggest. Mr. Justice Miller, in a separate opinion,
concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, reached the same result
without having to interrelate the fourth and fifth amendments.
Justice Miller noted that the order, either to produce a document
or to have charges of a criminal nature taken as confessed, was
clearly prohibited by the fifth amendment, although it involved
neither a search nor a seizure.2" Limited in this way, Boyd has no
118 J.

§ 2264, at 382 n.4 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
supra note 12, at 59.
2 Id. Perhaps the Court indulged in writing " 'law office history,' which is merely a
function of ex parte advocacy." L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
"

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE

J. LANDYNSKI,

265 (1972).
2,116 U.S. at 639-40.
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effect on document searches pursuant to a warrant, although it
continues to play an important role where documents are called
for by subpoena. The reason for the distinction has been expressed as follows:
For though the documents or chattels thus sought [by subpoena]
be not oral in form, and though they be already in existence and not
desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still there is a testimonial disclosure implicit in their production. It is the witnesses' assurance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles produced are the ones demanded. No meaningful distinction can be
drawn between a communication necessarily implied by legally
compelled conduct and one authenticating the articles expressly
made under compulsion in court. Testimonial acts of this
sort-authenticating or vouching for pre-existing chattels-are not
typical of the sort of disclosures which are caught in the main current of history and sentiments giving vitality to the privilege. Yet
they are within the borders of its protection.Y

Although Judge Seth criticized as artificial this distinction,
relied upon by the majority in Shaffer, it does have meaning in
light of the interests which the fifth amendment was intended to
protect as will be shown below. Moreover, an interpretation of the
fifth amendment which ignores its historical limitation to testimonial evidence" can, like the dictum in Boyd, serve to improperly mingle two amendments which are basically different in
origin and character and can result in considerable confusion
about both. 7
History cannot alone determine the content of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Most constitutional provisions have
grown or evolved to some degree since the 18th century. 8 The
legal concepts which may have been at the core of Entick or Boyd
must be reconsidered in light of policies today believed to be
fostered by the fourth and fifth amendments. 9

III.

THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING THE PRIVILEGE

The court in Shaffer said very little about the policy consid2' 8 J.
26

WIGMORE,

supra note 21, at 379-80.

Id. at 379.

11J. LANDYNSKI,

supra note 12, at 59.
See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679 (1968).
"

See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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erations supporting its decision. It noted that, if the Shaffers'
arguments were carried to a logical extreme, searches for all types
of evidence-even instrumentalities of crime-would be curtailed
and the ability of society to bring criminals to justice would be
hampered." Although this argument is vulnerable to the suggestion that the fifth amendment was, indeed, intended to make it
somewhat more difficult to convict offenders,"' it serves to raise
the question of whether documents should be treated for purposes
of the fifth amendment privilege as fundamentally different from
other non-oral evidence.
Exhaustive analyses of the privilege and the policies behind
it have already been undertaken by Judge Friendly 32 and by Professor McNaughton,3 and cannot be improved upon here. Nevertheless, even a cursory review of these policies will serve to demonstrate that most of them, whether articulated by the Supreme
Court or by commentators, are no more applicable to a search for
documents pursuant to warrant than they would be to other chat34
tels sought in the same manner.
A comprehensive list of the policies supporting the privilege
was presented for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Goldberg in
35
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important
advance in the development of our liberty-'one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' " It reflects
many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisatorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him
and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
523 F.2d at 179.
1' Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1971).
32 Friendly, supra note 28.
33 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2251.
11 Judge Friendly has suggested that the privilege be entirely abolished with regard
to chattels, including documents, sought either by subpoena or other legal process.
Friendly, supra note 28, at 701-03 (1968). His analysis of the relevant policy considerations
would apply with even greater force where production is required by search warrant alone.
- 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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to shoulder the entire load" . . . ; our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life" . . . ; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection
36
to the innocent.

Almost all of the enumerated policies apply solely to a testimonial privilege rather than a privilege from the production of preexisting documents. Some of the stated policies could conceivably
apply to documents and are briefly treated here for that reason.
First, the relationship of government and individual would
certainly be affected by an application of the privilege to documents. Although it is impossible to determine when a fair "stateindividual balance" has been achieved, it is arguable that the
fourth amendment requirements which all valid search warrants
must meet, whether documents or other chattels are sought, are
sufficient to preserve that proper balance. Fairness to the individual is no more compromised by a search for papers than by a
search for a gun, so long as the state observes the proper procedural prerequisites.
The "protection to the innocent" argument could also plausibly apply to searches for documents, as Boyd and Entick suggest.
This "policy," however, has largely been repudiated by the Supreme Court itself.37
More difficult to deal with is the "privacy" or "private enclave" theory which Mr. Justice Douglas recently developed at
length in his dissent in Couch v. United States.3" There can be
little question that a search of a person's documents and records,
however undertaken, is a compromise of his privacy. But freedom
from all compromises of privacy is not necessarily a fundamental
right. The imposition of controls on a valid search and, perhaps,
a limitation upon the type of documents subject to search may
properly define the limits of such a right, if it exists in this context. The Supreme Court has suggested that there may be an area
or a category of documents or chattels so private that the govern378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
37 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). See also Friendly, supra
note 27, at 686-87; McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.
193, 207-08.
- 409 U.S. 322, 338 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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ment may make no inquiry into them.3 9 Since the Court has not
defined an area of absolute privilege it may be useful to consider
what documents, if not all documents, merit the application of
such a doctrine. The clearest case for the application of an absolute privilege would be that of documents which embody ideas,
the expression of which is protected by the first amendment. If
these documents deserve protection, it is because of their content.
They arguably deserve no less protection than the oral expression
of the same thoughts. In this sense they are very different from
other chattels-whether communicative or non-communicative
in character. Financial records, business records, and documents
employed in the commission of crimes do not merit the same
constitutional favor.40
In terms of values to be protected by the fifth amendment,
the latter documents are really not different from items of real
evidence, which sometimes may also be of a very "personal" nature but which, nevertheless, are not exempt from search or seizure. Even if the state cannot inquire about certain documents,
it is arguable that the fifth amendment is not the proper source
of protection for the non-incriminating ideas expressed. A disinterested magistrate should, in accordance with the fourth amendment, stand between the government and the individual whose
documents are to be examined. The government's ability to compromise the privacy of any documents should be tested at that
point.
The Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), noted that:
This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of
evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of
a reasonable search and seizure.
Id. at 303.
," See Friendly, supra note 28, at 687-90; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 318. Judge
Fairchild, dissenting in Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971), outlined some of the considerations which should be applied here:
Assuming, however, that there is a class of papers so intimately confidential
and so much a part of the personhood that they ought to enjoy a superlative
privacy and be protected from seizure upon an adequately grounded warrant,
it does not seem to me that the records in question here have the required
character. They appear to have been maintained for business and professional purposes, with the knowledge and assistance of employees, and the
manner in which they were allegedly kept and used, made them, in a sense,
instrumentalities of the tax evasion offense claim.
Id. at 150.
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Of course, neither the magistrate nor even the government
officials who are applying for a warrant may have any inkling that
documents enjoying the protection of the first amendment are to
be examined, and so, as Judge Seth argued in Shaffer, it is the
search itself which will offend privacy, and not the seizure of some
incriminating papers. However true this may be, it is important
to recall that not all searches, but only unreasonablesearches, are
prohibited by the Constitution. 1 Further, the Constitution specifically foresaw that reasonable searches would be made of "papers and effects. ' 4 2 Some documents which express ideas may also,
for totally unrelated reasons, (e.g., because they bear a significant
date or because of handwriting appearing on them), incriminate
the author or owner. Such papers could be protected if the Supreme Court chooses to deliniate an absolute area of privacy.
Short of such a decision, there is arguably no reason why such
papers cannot be used in ways which would not in any way compromise first amendment freedoms.
The Tenth Circuit in Shaffer appropriately looked to the
fourth amendment as the bulwark against invasion of privacy by
the government. The behavior by the IRS which Judge Seth believed to be so offensive can be sufficiently tested by the fourth
amendment alone. The right of privacy is unquestionably violated by the invasion of a home upon mere suspicion, the indiscriminate ransacking of belongings, and seizure of property. The
fifth amendment need not be called upon to curb such outrageous
behavior. Each amendment has its separate role to play in protecting the individual. They "are complimentary to, though not
dependent upon, each other."43
IV. DOCUMENTS AS PROTECTED "COMMUNICATIONS"
Both the majority and the dissent in Shaffer approached the
case as if the fifth amendment issue were primarily whether the
Shaffers were subject to "compulsion" by the Government to
incriminate themselves. The majority held that there was no
compulsion because the IRS agents searched for the documents
"

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (concurring opinion); See, J.
supra note 12, at 60. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
Supreme Court approved "searches" involving even oral communications, if proper safeguards are employed.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
, L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT 394 (1968).
LANDYNSKI,
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themselves, and the dissent properly indicated that search warrants too are rather compelling process.44 Supreme Court decisions since Boyd v. United States4 5 have defined the issue more
sharply and offer a solution which does not depend on that troubling but not terribly helpful word "compulsion."
In Warden v. Hayden 6 the Supreme Court rejected the
"mere evidence" rule which had prohibited searches for evidence,
as opposed to instrumentalities of crime, fruits, or contraband.
Prior to Hayden, only the latter could be properly sought and
seized. The Court in Hayden based its departure from the old
rule47 and its decision to admit the evidence seized (articles of
clothing) upon the determination that the evidence was not
"'testimonial' or 'communicative' in nature, and [its] introduction therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness
against himself in violation of the fifth amendment."4 8 The emphasis was on the nature of the evidence and not on the compulsory nature of the process by which it was produced.
The Court in Hayden alluded to a distinction perhaps first
raised by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States.4" The
defendant in Holt was compelled to put on a blouse in order to
determine whether it belonged to him. He objected on fifth
amendment grounds. Justice Holmes rated his contention as "an
extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment,"5 0 because, although the resulting evidence was incriminating, no "communi51
cation" was extorted from the accused.
Schmerber v. California52 again raised the same distinction.
Judge Ely dissenting in VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 373 (9th Cir. 1974),
noted that a person to whom a search warrant is directed refuses "production" at his peril:
One need ask only what would happen if the addressee of a warrant refused
to allow the search to be conducted to appreciate the magnitude of compulsion produced by a search warrant. Without the slightest hesitation his doors
would be broken down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired
material would be seized. How the imminence of such force can be considered as anything other than compulsion escapes us.
,5116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
, The "mere evidence" rule was established in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921).
" 387 U.S. at 302-03.
4' 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
" Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
52 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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There, a police officer compelled a driver of an automobile to
submit to the extraction from his body of a blood sample. The
sample was then analyzed for alcohol content and used as evidence against the driver. Despite the obvious compulsion of the
defendant to assist the state in prosecuting him, the Court held
that the removal of the blood did not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination because "the privilege is a bar against compelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but [the] compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate it." 3
Assuming the propriety of the Holt-Hayden-Schmerber distinction as an analytical tool, how are letters, papers, and other
documents to be treated if sought by search warrant? Some argue
that documents sought in a search are the very type of communication which the Supreme Court had in mind in Schmerber and
similar cases, because documents are "communicative" in nature.54 This analysis is fallacious. The term "communication" can
also be a catchword and, as such, no more helpful than the word
"compulsion." It is not the nature of items seized which is critical, but the nature of the acts required of the individual. Blood
samples, if analyzed, convey meaning; but the individual from
whom they are taken is not required to act in a way which in itself
conveys his own knowledge to the government, which may then
use it against him. Thus, if the state were to serve a defendant
with a subpoena to produce a weapon used in a particular crime,
the accused could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
because his production of the weapon, as the one identified in the
subpoena, would amount to an admission of guilt. The subpoena
would require a communicative act rather than an item which in
itself could constitute a communication. On the other hand, a
lawful search of the person of a robbery suspect which reveals a
note saying "This is a Stickup" cannot reasonably be said to
Id. at 764. Similar distinctions were drawn in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (suspect required to give handwriting exemplars which were admitted in evidence
at trial); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (accused required to appear in a
lineup). In the latter case the Court noted:
It is a compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have.
388 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
54 See, e.g., Comment, Use of the Summons, Intervention and Constitutional Rights,
2 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 135, 176 (1974).
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violate the fifth amendment. The individual should be in no better position where the object found happens to be a writing than
he would be if a weapon were found.
Professor Zechariah Chafee, some fifty years ago, succinctly
defined the governing principle:
The privilege is violated when a man is compelled to do something
active, whereas he usually remains passive during an unreasonable
search and seizure.5

There is a real difference, in a fifth amendment sense, between a subpoena and a search warrant. The subpoena requires
an act which communicates, i.e., which divulges knowledge. The
search warrant requires an act too-but not one which reveals
knowledge or conveys information.
CONCLUSION

The court in Shaffer appears, then, to have reached the
proper result. Preexisting documents, despite some argument to
the contrary, were probably not protected from disclosure by the
early privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is their protection
required by the policies behind the privilege. They are logically
no different from other chattels sought by a proper warrant.
The confusion about the status of documentary evidence perhaps results from the long asserted but somewhat cloudy "intimate retationship" between the fourth and fifth amendments. To
say that these amendments are not interrelated robs neither one
of any meaning or effect. It only serves to clarify discussion of the
rights which flow from each. The Boyd case-and the fifth
amendment itself-have acquired an almost mystical significance with time which makes it difficult to eliminate emotion
from any discussion of them. To some extent this is praiseworthy.
The fifth amendment is a symbol of certain national aspirations.5"
Nevertheless, its scope should not be broadened without carefully
questioning how the result coincides with those aspirations. Finally, it would be foolish to lose sight of the position that the
fourth amendment occupies in protecting the individual wholly
apart from any function of the fifth. The requirement that the
state measure up to definite standards and limitations before it
5 Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HAiv. L.
5 E. GiuswoLD, TE Firm AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).

REV.

673, 697-98 (1922).
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may presume to compromise the person and property of the individual is the appropriate safeguard against overzealous or oppressive public officials.

JUVENILE LAW: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CORRECTIONS
During the 1974-75 term the Tenth Circuit made notable rulings in five criminal cases involving juveniles.
United States v. Watts' presented the question whether a
juvenile's right to due process was violated by the failure of the
police to give adequate notice of the charges against him to his
parents. Watts, a minor aged 17, was charged by information with
juvenile delinquency-manslaughter, arising from the stabbing
death of his brother. On appeal, Watts contended that his due
process rights were violated when his parents were not given adequate notice. The court found that notice to a juvenile's parents
is not a due process right, but rather a procedural safeguard.
Therefore, failure to give notice to parents is not such a denial of
substantive due process as to require reversal. 2
In re Gault, 3 cited by the appellant, set the standard for the
type of notice required by due process for juvenile delinquency
proceedings. The Supreme Court in Gault said that due process
requires that a hearing in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to custody are at stake cannot be held without giving
the parents timely notice.' Gault required that the child and his
parents be notified in writing of the charges and allegations at the
earliest practicable time and sufficiently in advance to permit
adequate preparation for the hearing.' In Gault the notice to the
juvenile's mother was found to be inadequate where she was informed orally, on the day the juvenile was taken into custody,
that there would be a hearing the next day.
513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975).
2

Id. at 8.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 33-34.
Id.
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The Tenth Circuit found 6 the rights enumerated in Gault to
be based on constitutional protections and, thus, equally applicable to a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 7
such as that in Watts. Section 5033 of that Act states:
Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such
juvenile of his legal rights. . . and shall immediately notify. . . the
juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody.

The court's concern in Watts was whether violation of the
Gault standard per se constituted such a deprivation of the juvenile's right to due process as to require reversal. The court read
Gault loosely as requiring only "fair treatment"' and concluded
that Watts was not denied such fair treatment Notice to a juvenile's parents, the court said, is for a purpose similar to that of
insuring that the juvenile has the assistance of counsel and can
prepare an adequate defense." It was found that, in fact, Watts
had not been denied due process. Even though his parents were
not notified by the authorities, he was represented by competent
counsel, and his mother and stepfather were available to assist
him.
Finding that the failure to notify Watts' parents was not
willful and that the Government's case was not enhanced by
the failure to notify them," the court decided that reversal was
not necessary. It reasoned that only a prophylactic safeguard, and
not a basic due process right, was violated.'"
The court thus treated the question as whether Watts was in
fact denied fair treatment, rather than whether a due process
requirement of notice to parents was violated. It gave little substantive effect to the language in section 5033 of the Juvenile
513 F.2d at 6.
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. 1975).
1 In support of its loose reading of In re Gault, the court quoted the Supreme Court's
statement in Gault that the due process standards established there were to be "intelligently and not ruthlessly administered." 387 U.S. at 21. The circuit court also cited Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975), in which the Supreme Court quoted Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "[D]ue process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 513 F.2d at 7-8.
7

513 F.2d at 9.
Id. at 7, citing Holloway v. Wainwright, 451 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1971); Kempler v.
Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).

Id. at 9.
Id. at 7, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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Delinquency Act, which says notice shall be given to the juvenile's parents.
The Tenth Circuit expressed its agreement with a federal
district court in Florida, 3 which read Gault as establishing that
juveniles should be treated as adults in regard to certain constitutional rights. However, the emphasis behind the Juvenile Delinquency Act has been to proceed against juveniles as juveniles and
to avoid prosecution as criminals;' 4 the Tenth Circuit has noted
this particular purpose in at least two previous cases, 5 one of
which was handed down earlier this year. The specific procedural
standards set out in Gault and the congressional mandate regarding notice in the Juvenile Delinquency Act'" likewise emphasize
special treatment of juveniles, and not the general "fair treatment" standard which the court has applied in Watts.
The provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, as
amended in September 1974,'1 were made available to a juvenile
indicted before the effective date of the Act in United States v.
Mechem.'" The United States sought a writ of mandamus and
prohibition directing Judge Mechem to vacate his order that the
prosecution substitute an information for its indictment against
the 14-year-old respondent Chavez in connection with charges of
rape and murder. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial judge
that the amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Act, which
require that a juvenile under age 16 who is not surrendered to
state authorities be proceeded against under the juvenile statute, 9 should be applied to the subject juvenile who had been
arraigned 1 month before the effective date of the amendments.
The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act effective at the time
Chavez had been arraigned" excluded Chavez from treatment
because of the serious nature of the charges against him. 2' The
11Walker

v. Florida, 328 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.

1972).
See, e.g., Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963).
United States v. Mechem, 509 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1975); Cotton v. United States,
355 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 5033 (Supp. 1975).
17 Id. §§ 5031-42.
' 509 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. 1975).
Ch. 645, §§ 5031-37, 62 Stat. 857 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp.
1975).
11The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act defined "juvenile" as a person under 18 and
'5
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trial court held, however, that the policy behind the 1974 amendments was to control proceedings against juveniles and that the
amendments evidenced an intent to remove juveniles from the
ordinary criminal process. Contrary to its reasoning in Watts,"2
the circuit court agreed," implicitly recognizing that the purpose
of the Juvenile Delinquency Act is to avoid prosecution of
juveniles as criminals." The court was persuaded that Congress
did not intend the ordinary criminal process to continue, through
the saving statute, 5 to apply to juveniles not yet tried. The
court's ruling was based on policy considerations; although the
Juvenile Delinquency Act also deals with substantive offenses, its
policy and procedural features are much more important.
In Roddy v. United States2 6 the Tenth Circuit upheld an
adult sentence imposed on a 22-year-old found guilty of robbery,
even though the sentence was to be served consecutively with a
27
sentence previously imposed under the Youth Corrections Act.
The defendant Roddy was given an indeterminate sentence under
the Youth Act 28 by an Arizona court, which found affirmatively
that treatment under the Youth Corrections Act would be beneficial.2 9 Subsequently, Roddy was convicted of an earlier robbery
"juvenile delinquency" as a violation of a law, by a juvenile, not punishable by death or
life imprisonment. Ch. 645, § 5031, 62 Stat. 857 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 5031
(Supp. 1975).
2 513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
11 509 F.2d at 1195.
2' Accord, Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1966); Fagerstrom v.
United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963).
1 U.S.C. § 109 (1970), which provides:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated
as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
25 509 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1975).
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
2A Id. § 5010(b). This section provides that in the case of a youth offender whose
offense is punishable by imprisonment, the court may instead sentence the youth to the
custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision under the Act, until it is
determined by the Youth Correction Division of the Board of Parole that the youth should
be discharged.
- 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970), titled "Young Adult Offenders," provides that where a
defendant is age 22-26 at the time of conviction, a court may look at the defendant's prior
record, social background, mental and physical health, and other pertinent factors, and
it may sentence the young offender under the Federal Youth Corrections Act if the court
reasonably believes that the defendant will benefit from such treatment.
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in New Mexico, and received an adult sentence of 5 years to run
consecutively to the Arizona youth sentence. A concurrent sentence was rejected by the New Mexico court because it found that
peoples' lives were endangered by the robbery.
Defendant argued that the consecutive sentence imposed in
New Mexico frustrated the rehabilitative purpose behind the
Youth Act sentence given by the Arizona court. While acknowledging that the conjunction of the youth sentence and consecutive adult sentence has a "deleterious effect on the rehabilitative
design of the Act,"30 the Tenth Circuit concluded, citing Nast v.
United States," that a youth sentence for one offense did not bar
a sentence under a different act for another prior or subsequent
offense. The court quoted the following language from Nast:
"[T]he problem raised by appellant is for such legislative consideration as it might enlist, rather
than one to be solved as
3
appellant presses upon this court.
Dorszynski v. United States was relied on to support the
court's interpretation of the Youth Act as enlarging, not restricting the sentencing options of courts, and, thus, keeping sentencing within the judge's discretion. The court stated that eligibility
for sentencing under the Act does not confer a right to be sentenced under it; a judge may decide not to apply the Act. 34 Also,
as in this case, there is discretion to apply the Act to a defendant
not otherwise eligible, if it is decided he will benefit from treatment under the Act. Finally, the court noted, the Youth Act does
3
not provide that a sentence under the Act shall be preemptive.
The court reviewed its prior holding in Price v. United
States3 in which it was determined that an indeterminate sentence imposed under the Youth Act for one of three counts could
not be increased by imposition of consecutive sentences on the
other two counts in the indictment. In Price it was pointed out
that cumulative or consecutive sentences would not fit the reha1* 509 F.2d at 1147.
31 415 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 340.
418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974).
509 F.2d at 1147.
38
Id.

- 384 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1967).
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bilitative purpose of the indeterminate sentences imposed under
the Youth Act. 7
The Tenth Circuit decided, however, that Nast rather than
Price should be controlling where, as in this case, the sentences
are not in statutory or constitutional conflict and the second offense arises under a different statute. The court failed to note,
however, its own finding in Nast that there was a rehabilitative
purpose behind the adult sentence imposed in that case as the
sentencing judge had provided for parole within a year." In the
present case judicial discretion was emphasized rather than the
rehabilitative purpose behind the Federal Youth Corrections
Act. 9
In Jackson v. United States 0 the Tenth Circuit decided that
the Supreme Court ruling in Dorszynski v. United States4 need
not be given retroactive effect. That ruling required that an express finding be made on the record that a youth will not benefit
from treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act42 before
sentencing him as an adult.43
Jackson was sentenced to 18 years for bank robbery; he contended on appeal that an express finding of "no benefit" was not
made. The court decided that the purpose of the new rule in
Dorszynski was to show clearly that the sentencing judge was
11Id. at 652. The court said that the "elasticity" in the Youth Act was conducive to
rehabilitation. Section 5017(c) sets outer limits on the length of time a youth may be kept
under supervision, while section 5010(b) provides for release before those times when the
Correction Division determines.
415 F.2d at 340.
3' See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950):
The proposed legislation is designed to make available for the discretionary
use of the Federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of
[youth offenders] that will promote the rehabilitation of those who in the
opinion of the sentencing judge show promise of becoming useful citizens
See also Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963), in which the court reviews
at length the rehabilitative purpose of the Federal Youth Corrections Act in support of
its conclusion that confinement under the Act is for corrective and preventive guidance
and rehabilitation and is not for punishment.
40 510 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
'z 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
'3 The express finding requirement in Dorszynski could be satisfied by any expression
that clearly showed that the sentencing judge considered the alternatives of sentencing
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act and decided that the youth offender would not
derive benefit from such treatment.
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aware of the sentencing options." The Tenth Circuit found that
in this case the district court was fully aware of the Youth Act
and of Jackson's eligibility under the Act at the time of sentencing. Therefore, the purpose of the Dorszynski rule was achieved
despite the absence of an express finding of no benefit.
The court, using the criteria for retroactivity set out in
Michigan v. Payne,4 5 found that reliance on the procedural standard in effect before Dorszynski and the effect of retroactivity on
the administration of justice both dictated against retroactive
application of the new rule." The court said that many courts had
relied justifiably on the prior procedural standard, and retroactivity would needlessly subject to question a substantial number of
properly imposed sentences. 7
5 the Tenth Circuit decided that the 6In Suggs v. Daggett"
year maximum custody period established under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act 4" requires that the youth must have been
in actual or constructive custody during the 6 years. In so doing,
1 The

Supreme Court in Dorszynski said, "Once it is made clear that the sentencing

judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it . no appellate review is warranted." 418 U.S. at 443.
5 412 U.S. 47 (1973). The criteria used to determine whether a newly announced rule
is to be given retrospective application are: (1) The purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent
of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice.
" The court cited Holliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969), in which strict
adherence to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was not required retroactively. Holliday looked at the large number of convictions obtained through justified
reliance on the old standard and the disruptive effect their reversal would have. See also
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967), which held that "[tihe extent to which a
condemned practice infects the integrity of the truth-determining process . . . must ...
be weighed against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of
retroactivity upon the administration of justice."
1 510 F.2d at 1337. See also Owens v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 780 (D. Pa. 1974),
in which Dorszynski was held not to be retroactive. The court in Owens found the
Dorszynski requirement to be prophylactic, not a substantive right, and decided that
retroactivity would seriously affect sentences imposed in several circuits where it had been
held, before Dorszynski, that a "no benefit" finding could be implied from the record. Id.
at 785. It would be impossible, the court noted, for judges to go back and offer affirmative
reasons for all the sentences meted out before Dorszynski.
" 522 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1975).
49 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1970). Section 5017(c) of the Act provides:
A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be
released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four
years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally
on or before six years from the date of his conviction.
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the court restated its previous holding that a sentence of imprisonment is served by confinement in fact or by unrevoked parole.50
Petitioner Suggs instituted a habeas corpus proceeding, alleging his entitlement to release from custody under the Youth
Act on the ground that section 5017(c) of the Act makes release
at the end of 6 years mandatory. In fact, he was in an escape
status for 82 days during the 6-year period, and the 82 days were
not counted in computing the release date.
In reliance on Rogers v. United States,5' the district court
held that the 6-year period was mandatory, and, once the period
has expired, the youth must be released.5 2 The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that both section 5017(c) and the language in
Rogers which emphasized a 6-year maximum custody period53
assumed actual or constructive custody or parole:
To rule that escape time counts would be to disregard the object and
spirit of the Youth Corrections Act which contemplates commitment for treatment looking to rehabilitation."

Loretta B. Huffine
r Postelwait v. Willingham, 365 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1966); Weathers v. Willingham,
356 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963). Rogers concerned a due process challenge to the 6year maximum period where the period of confinement under the Youth Corrections Act
was potentially longer than the maximum sentence provided for in the statute under
which the offender was charged. The court rejected the due process argument, saying that
the Youth Corrections Act allowed for an offender to be released earlier than the maximum, depending on the youth's response to corrective treatment. If the period of confinement, up to 6 years, did turn out to be greater than the maximum sentence under the
statute violated, it was not for punishment, but for rehabilitation. See also 18 U.S.C. §
5006(g) (1970), which defines treatment under the Act as "corrective and preventive
guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders."
2 522 F.2d at 396-97.
' 326 F.2d at 57.
' 522 F.2d at 397.

